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Abstract  
 
Unincorporated enterprises often bypass formal regulations in general and taxation in particular. 
Bringing unincorporated enterprises under taxation system is a challenge often faced by tax 
administrators and it is in this regard the present study explores the factors which influence 
decision of unincorporated enterprises to get registered with State Value Added Tax (VAT)/ 
sales tax authority. This analysis is limited to the decision regarding registration. It is not 
necessary that enterprises which are registered will pay taxes and/or file return- however; the 
process of registration does provide some information to the tax department for follow up. The 
study throws up some interesting results for policy makers and tax administrators.  
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Determinants of Registration of Unincorporated Enterprises under State Value Added Tax 
Act in India 
 
Introduction 
 
The first step towards participation in most tax regimes is registration in the regime. The 
existence of an informal sector in most economies, perhaps larger informal economies in 
developing countries, where the agents do not participate in the tax regime raises concerns for 
tax departments. From the taxpayers’ perspective, being in the tax regime would be associated 
with certain costs and certain benefits. If the costs exceed the benefits, it is expected that the 
taxpayer would choose to remain outside the realm of taxation. Some studies have explored 
whether formalisation helps a firm in increasing its value added or profits (see for instance, 
Demenet, et al, 2016; and McKenzie and Sakho, 2010). Participation in the tax system is 
important for tax administration as well since it can crucially influence tax revenue as well as tax 
morale in the country (Hofmann et al., 2008). The present paper is an attempt to identify the 
factors that might influence the decision of the enterprises to register for taxes, specifically for 
the value added tax.  
 
For India, the study acquires added importance in the context of introduction of the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) regime. With a reduction in the extent of cascading in the tax regime, it is 
argued by some, that move to GST would result in expansion of economic activity. Since this 
new tax regime works through more integrated and redefined supply chains, for units to benefit 
from this new tax regime and for the success of the new regime, it is important that more and 
more firms find it useful to be a part of the GST regime. While firms and enterprises in the 
organised sector do participate in the GST regime, those in the unorganised sector may not be as 
well integrated. This poses a problem both for the units and the tax administration. For the 
former, apart from being unable to benefit from the growth enhancing processes in the economy, 
these units may also be subject to irregular visits by various authorities potentially associated 
with the payment of bribes. For the tax department, non-participation by a segment of the 
economy can induce lower confidence in the tax regime resulting in higher non-compliance even 
among segments which would normally pay taxes.  
 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine within the space of unincorporated sector, the extent of 
participation in the tax regime among enterprises which are required by law to participate and 
then to identify characteristics of enterprises which could  be associated with non-participation. 
This analysis is undertaken with a focus on state VAT regimes in India. The focus is not on the 
amount of taxes paid but on whether the enterprise is registered with the tax department or not. 
This exercise can provide some inputs for designing policies to bring these enterprises into the 
mainstream. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: the following section explores definitions of informal 
economy or unorganised economy in a country like India. In section 3 we provide brief literature 
review on registration under VAT and informality. This is followed by description of the 
database and restrictions imposed to select the sample enterprises. We explore the factors that 
could influence VAT registration of enterprises in section 5. We provide detailed methodology to 
econometrically understand the differences in behavior across enterprises – more specifically, 
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binary choice Probit models are estimated to explore factors that influence the decision of 
enterprises to register with the VAT department and discuss results in section 6. The final section 
provides some concluding observations. 
 
2. Searching for a Definition of Informality  
Reducing informality is often seen as one of the central objectives of tax reforms (Kanbur and 
Keen, 2015), and proposed GST system for India also envisages that informality will go down. 
However, reducing informality “may not be a useful guide to making tax policy” (Kanbur and 
Keen, 2015). For one, there are many definitions of informal economy or unorganised economy 
in a country like India. The definition of informality set out by ILO (2013) is based on labour 
and enterprise regulation rather than on tax consideration. In fact all Acts and Rules in India 
consider size of employment and capital investment to classify the sector into registered and 
unregistered (or organised vs. unorganised). To provide an overview of the differences in 
definitions adopted by different regulators in India, we summarise some of the important 
regulations which deal with the informal/ small/ unorganised economy in India.  
Indian manufacturing sector is categorised into organised and unorganised activities based on 
status of registration under Indian Factories Act, 1948. Indian Factories Act, 1948 (under section 
2(m)) defines ‘factories’ (organised activities) as those:  
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the 
preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being 
carried on with the aid of power,1 or is ordinarily so carried on, or 
 (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are  working, or were working on any day of the 
preceding twelve months, and in any part of which  a manufacturing process is being 
carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on.2 
Therefore, Indian Factories Act defines organised and unorganised manufacturing on the basis of 
number of workers and the source of energy. In this definition, no consideration is given to 
registration with tax authority to define organised manufacturing. 
The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act, 2006 is applicable for 
enterprises engaged in manufacturing / production of goods (pertaining to an industry specified 
                                                          
1
 According to Indian Factories Act, "power" means electrical energy, or any other form of  energy which is 
mechanically transmitted and is not generated by human or animal agency.  
2
 However, it does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit 
belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place. For 
details see http://dgms.gov.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/Factories%20Act,%201948.pdf (last accessed on 24 June 
2017) 
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in Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951) or engaged in providing or rendering of 
services. The MSMED Act defines enterprises as follows:   
Type of Enterprise  Manufacturing Industries – 
Investment in Plant & 
Machinery  
Service Industries – 
Investment in Equipment  
Micro Enterprise  Not exceeding INR 2.5 
million 
Not exceeding INR 1 million 
Small Enterprise  More than INR 2.5 million to 
INR 20 million  
More than INR 1 million to 
INR 20 million  
Medium Enterprise  More than INR 20 million to 
INR 100 million  
More than INR 20 million to 
INR 50 million 
Note: USD 1 = INR 64.07 (as on 25 June 2017) 
Enterprises falling under this definition are required to register under the MSMED Act and file 
the Information Memorandum with prescribed authorities in such manner as prescribed under the 
act.   
In this definition, size of investment in plant and machinery (for manufacturing enterprises) or 
equipment (for service providers) is the only factor taken for consideration and once again there 
is no requirement for registration with any tax authority.  
Depending on registration under Indian Companies Act, 1956 businesses are classified as 
incorporated and unincorporated entities. There are a few options for businesses to organise their 
business and registering under the Indian Companies Act is one such option. Other options are 
Firms (partnership), Association of Persons (AOPs), Body of Individuals (BOIs), proprietary 
enterprise, charitable entities, self-help groups, trusts, others. Tax treatments (under direct tax) of 
these business organisations vary where Corporates and Firms are subject to pay Corporate 
Income Tax, AOPs, BOIs and proprietors face income tax similar to individuals, co-operative 
societies face different tax rate.       
In sampling the unorganised enterprises in India, the National Sample Survey Office divides 
proprietary enterprises further into two categories, own account enterprises (OAE) and 
establishment. The establishment is further divided into non-directory establishment and 
directory establishment. The definitions of them are as follows:   
a) Own-account Enterprise (OAE): An enterprise, which is run without any hired worker 
employed on a fairly regular basis,3 is termed as an own account enterprise. 
b) Establishment: An enterprise which is employing at least one hired worker on a fairly 
regular basis is termed as establishment. Paid or unpaid apprentices, paid household 
member/servant/resident worker in an enterprise are considered as hired workers. 
                                                          
3
 Here "fairly regular basis" means the major part of the period when operation(s) of an enterprise are carried out 
during a reference period. 
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(i) Non-directory establishment (NDE): An establishment having one to five workers 
(household and hired taken together) is termed as a non-directory establishment. 
(ii) Directory establishment (DE): A directory establishment is an establishment, which 
has got six or more workers (household and hired taken together).        
In addition to above Acts, businesses are also required to register under different acts, such as 
Shops and Establishment Act,4 Trade License (Municipal Corporation/ Panchayats/ Local 
Body),5 Value Added Tax (VAT)/ Sales Tax Act, Provident Fund Act,6 Employees State 
Insurance Corporation Act etc. which in turn have their own definitions on who is required to 
register.7 Of these, the tax regime uses the turnover of the enterprise as the basis for determining 
whether an enterprise needs to be registered or not. 
The above discussion shows that there are multiple definitions under different acts to define/ 
categorise businesses in India. The existence of different definitions under different acts may be 
due to the purposes for which the acts were established. However, broadly number of workers 
and investment in plant and machinery (or equipment) are the major indicators chosen to classify 
the activities. But tax policy tends to focus on incomes or on turnovers rather than investment or 
employment. In other words, while the other regulations focus on the processes involved in the 
economic activity, the tax department is more focused on the outcome of the activity. While 
there can be some overlaps in these different definitions, there is no reason to expect them to 
converge completely. In studying informality with respect to taxes, therefore, it is useful to focus 
on the variable of interest in defining tax liability, i.e., incomes or turnover as the case may be.  
If one considers informality with respect to taxes, then there can be two types of agents in the 
informal sector. There may be instances when businesses legally obliged to pay taxes do not pay 
it and alternatively, there may be instances when businesses are not legally obliged to pay the 
taxes (either VAT or income tax) as their annual turnover or income falls below the threshold.8 
                                                          
4
 Related to the regulation of hours of work, payment of wages, leave, holidays, terms of service and other  
conditions of work of persons employed in shops, commercial establishments, establishments for public 
entertainment or amusement and other establishments and to provide for certain matters connected therewith. 
5
 Trade License is a certificate/document which grants the permission to carry on a particular trade or business for 
which it is issued. It does not confer ownership of property or permission for any other activity other than for 
which it is issued. 
6
 Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) established under the Employees' Provident Funds & 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 to provide institutional support for provident funds, pension fund and deposit-
linked insurance fund for employees in factories and other establishments. 
http://www.epfindia.com/site_docs/PDFs/Downloads_PDFs/EPFAct1952.pdf (last accessed on 25 June 2017). 
7
 The promulgation of Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 envisaged an integrated need based social insurance 
scheme that would protect the interest of workers in contingencies such as sickness, maternity, temporary or 
permanent physical disablement, death due to employment injury resulting in loss of wages or earning capacity. 
The Act also guarantees reasonably good medical care to workers and their immediate dependents. 
http://esic.nic.in/esi_act.php  (last accessed on 25 June 2017). 
8
 Unlike income tax, VAT is not the direct cost to the enterprises unless entrepreneurs decide not pass on the costs to 
the next level of value addition or consumers.  
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Turning to the state VAT regimes in India, the rules do vary somewhat across states. In most 
states, all businesses are not legally required to be registered under VAT – any business with 
turnover below a certain threshold which does not undertake inter-state or international trade is 
not required to be registered. Further, even if they are registered, if their annual turnover is below 
the prescribed threshold for VAT registration, they do not have to pay taxes. The obligation to 
file tax return also varies across states. For some states, filing tax return under VAT/ sales tax is 
mandatory for all registered businesses even if they have zero annual turnovers (e.g., 
Maharashtra) whereas in others, filing is mandatory for registered businesses only if their annual 
turnover crosses the VAT threshold.  
However to participate in the tax regime, it is essential to register with the tax department. It 
might be argued that any business that registers with the tax department would either file a return 
or expect to file a return sometime in the near future. Considering registration therefore as an 
expression of intent to participate in the tax regime, the present study seeks to analyse this 
decision of unincorporated enterprises.  
       
3. Literature Review  
There are many studies which build theoretical models to understand the effects of VAT on 
informality (Boadway and Sato 2008, Emran and Stiglitz 2005, Keen 2008, Tumen 2016, Keen 
and Mintz 2004, Piggott and Whalley 2001, de Paula and Scheinkman, 2010, Joshi et al., 2014, 
Kanbur and Keen, 2014). There is also an emerging body of studies which empirically explore 
the factors influencing the registration for VAT. In this paper, given our focus, we explore the 
latter which look into the “role of the value added tax (VAT) in transmitting informality” (de 
Paula and Scheinkman 2010). 
For the Brazilian context (48,701 entrepreneurs in urban regions from all states in the Brazilian 
federation), de Paula and Scheinkman (2010) finds that tax registration is influenced by location 
of the firm (outside household), number of employees, revenue, having accesses to bank loan, 
education level of the owner, age of the owner, square of age of the owner, gender of the owner, 
product of home ownership and number of rooms in the home positively and significantly, 
whereas owner having access to another job influences tax registration negatively and 
significantly. The results show that location of the business or visibility matters in deciding 
whether to take tax registration. Firms located outside the household are more visible to 
regulators as compared to those operating from the premises of the household. Other factors 
related to the size of the business like number of employees and size of the revenue push the 
firms to take tax registration perhaps to get integrated with larger chains of businesses. Factors 
like access to bank loans pull the firms to take tax registration for easy access to formal credit, 
perhaps at a lower rate of interest. Owner specific factors like age, education level, gender, 
having other job, home ownership and size of the home in terms of number of rooms determine 
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the socio-economic background of the entrepreneur which influence their decision to take tax 
registration. 
 
4. Data  
If we define informality with specific to status in tax registration, there are some common 
perceptions about characteristics of informal sector. We attempt to test some of these 
characteristics with specific to unincorporated enterprises in India. Before dealing with 
characteristics and their support from literature, it would be worthwhile to provide a brief 
description of the database.  
National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) conducts quinquennial surveys on unincorporated 
enterprises.9 This paper is based on unit level data of the 67th round survey of NSSO (NSSO 
2012a).10In short, NSSO captures characteristics of the bottom strata of enterprises engaged in 
manufacturing, trading and services. A detailed description of the data is provided in Mukherjee 
and Rao (2015). For the present paper, we have restricted to our analysis to proprietary and 
partnership enterprises, as tax status of other categories (e.g., self-help groups, trusts) are not 
clear (Mukherjee and Rao, 2015).    
We have restricted our sample to proprietary enterprises and partnership firms engaged in 
manufacturing and/or trading activities. The rationale for excluding services is that majority of 
the service providers are not required to be registered under state VAT/ sales tax act (e.g., 
Transportation and storage activities, Postal and courier activities, Information and 
communications, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, Educational activity 
and Human health and social work activity). Further, since we would like to identify any state 
specific features as well, we have excluded states with very few observations. In particular, we 
have excluded any state which has less than 100 observations. Given that the focus of the present 
exercise is on businesses that are required to be registered, we have excluded all enterprises with 
turnover below the exemption threshold for the state in which they operate. Present VAT 
registration threshold varies across states and some states have different thresholds for 
manufacturer vis-à-vis trader – e.g., Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh (Table A1 in 
Appendix). We have restricted our sample size to only those enterprises whose annual turnover 
is higher than the prescribed threshold for VAT registration of the state where they are operating. 
                                                          
9
 According to NSSO (2012b), unincorporated enterprises imply not registered under the Companies Act, 1956. 
Further the domain of ‘unincorporated enterprises’ excluded (a) enterprises registered under Sections 2m(i) and 
2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 or bidi and cigar manufacturing enterprises registered under bidi and cigar 
workers (condition of employment) Act, 1966, (b) government/public sector enterprises and (c) cooperatives. Thus 
the coverage was restricted primarily to all household proprietary and partnership enterprises. In addition, Self 
Help groups (SHGs), Private Non-Profit institutions (NPIs) including Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households 
(NPISH) and Trusts. 
10
 The survey was conducted during June 2010 to July 2011. 
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Since registration of enterprises having annual turnover lower than the prescribed threshold is 
voluntary, we have considered only those enterprises which are legally required to be registered 
under the VAT/ Sales Tax Act of the respective state of their operation.11 
With all the restrictions (cleaning up of data), we are left with 47,528 observations, of which 
11,729 enterprises (24.7 percent) are registered, 19,675 enterprises (41.4 percent) are 
unregistered and 16,124 enterprises (33.9 percent) did not reveal their registration status during 
survey. All 47,528 sample enterprises are supposed to be registered under VAT, as their annual 
turnover is above the prescribed threshold for VAT registration, however only one-fourth of 
them are currently registered (Table A2 in Appendix). We have excluded enterprises who did not 
reveal their registration status during survey from our sample. Therefore, effectively our sample 
size becomes 31,404 (Table A2 in Appendix). 
In order to capture State specific factors influencing registration, we have included state 
dummies. However, out of 20 states we have selected for our analysis, one state is to serve as 
base state. The selection of the base state is based on average per capita Gross State Domestic 
Product (GSDP) during 2009-10 to 2011-12.12 The State having per capita GSDP close to 
median (Quartile 2) could be the base state. We found that Karnataka had average per capita 
GSDP of INR 45,227 which is approximately close to quartile 2 (INR 43,721) and therefore we 
have selected Karnataka as the base state (Table A1 in Appendix).  
 
5. Factors that could influence VAT registration 
5.1 Access to Credit Market 
Access to formal credit market is often cited as one of the major factors influencing 
entrepreneurs’ decision to become formal entity (Araujo and Rodrigues Jr. 2016, de Paula and 
Scheinkman 2010, de Paula and Scheinkman 2011). Higher interest rate in informal credit 
market and limited bargaining capacity of informal entrepreneurs in setting the interest rate 
and/or terms and conditions for repayment of loans and interest could be the factors influencing 
informal entrepreneurs to continue as informal entity. However, if informal entrepreneurs draw 
significant part of their credit requirement from informal creditors, they need to keep a 
                                                          
11
 Though enterprises having annual turnover below the prescribed threshold for VAT registration could register 
with State Tax Authority voluntarily, we have not considered this set of enterprises in our analysis as factors 
influencing their decision to register under VAT Act could be different from those whose annual turnover above 
the threshold. We found that only 1.6 percent of sample enterprises (after applying all data restrictions) having 
annual turnover below VAT registration threshold are registered (Appendix Table A1). States where VAT 
registration is high also witness higher instances of voluntary registration. Among those enterprises, majority of 
them are engaged in manufacturing of computer, electronic and optical products, manufacturing of 
pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products.     
12
 The data of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) at factor cost (constant 2004-05 prices) (2004-05 series) is 
taken from EPWRF (http://www.epwrfits.in/). 
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significant part of their transactions out of books of accounts so that they could repay the loans 
and interest in cash. This could imply that they might choose not to register under sales tax/ VAT 
and open up their books of accounts to the tax administration for scrutiny. Therefore, under this 
argument the status quo should continue and informal entrepreneurs should never become formal 
entities. In the sample under study, we found that both registered and un-registered enterprises 
take loan from both formal and informal creditors (see Table 1). Therefore, it appears that sales 
tax/ VAT registration is not a binding constraint to access credit from formal sources. To 
establish credit worthiness, the promoters of the enterprises need to file tax returns under direct 
taxes. However from the present database it cannot be confirmed whether the promoters of the 
enterprises were complying with income tax requirements.13 
To get a sense of how the sample firms behave, out of a total 31,404 enterprises, only 6,859 have 
reported to have taken credit from the formal sector and/or from the informal sector.14 Only 28 
percent of registered and 18 percent unregistered enterprises have taken credit. Table 1 presents a 
comparison of the credit taken and the associated interest rates reported by both un-registered 
and registered enterprises. Table 1 shows that 53 percent un-registered enterprises obtained 
credit only from formal sources, whereas 21 percent of registered enterprises have taken credit 
only from informal sources. In other words, registration under VAT Act is neither necessary nor 
sufficient condition to obtain credit from formal sources. Though majority of registered 
enterprises obtained credit from formal sources, more than one-fifth of the registered enterprises 
obtained credit only from informal sources. Only a small percentage of enterprises obtained 
credit from both the sources. There are significant differences in the average size of the 
outstanding loan between registered and un-registered enterprises across all sources of credit. 
One possible reason for this difference could be relative size of the enterprises. It is likely that 
registered enterprises are larger (in terms of turnover, employment, investment) as compared to 
unregistered enterprises and therefore their demand for credit is also larger.15  
Further, there is not much difference in the average interest rate between formal and informal 
sources of credit for the different categories of enterprises. Registered enterprises which have 
accessed credit from both the sources, paid on an average higher interest rate on informal credit. 
However, for these enterprises the difference in average interest rate between formal and 
informal credit is low (0.1%). Similarly, un-registered enterprises which have accessed credit 
from both the sources, paid higher interest on informal credit. For these enterprises, the 
                                                          
13
 However, based on a survey across three states in India (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Odisha), ILO (2014) 
concludes that among the sample enterprises (3029) level of compliance in VAT is much lower than income tax.   
14
 Credits from central and state level term lending institutions, government (central, state, local bodies), commercial 
banks, co-operative banks and societies, micro-finance institutions, and other institutional agencies are considered 
as formal sector credit and credits from money lenders, business partner(s), suppliers / contractors, friends and 
relatives, and others are considered as informal sector credit.  
15
 Average number of total workers in registered enterprises is 2.1 times higher than unregistered enterprises, 
average annual turnover for registered enterprises is 3.7 times higher than unregistered enterprises, and average 
annual investment in registered enterprises is 2 times higher than unregistered enterprises.    
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difference in average interest rate between formal and informal credit is 0.9 percent. As 
compared to registered enterprises, a large percentage (41%) of un-registered enterprises drawn 
credit from informal sources and they paid higher interest rate on informal credit (Table 1).    
Table 1: Sources of Credit and VAT registration 
Description Sources of Credit Registered Un-registered 
No. of Observations 
Take Credit Only from Formal 
Sources 
2,237 1,909 
(68.3) (53.2) 
Taken Credit Only from Informal 
Sources 
699 1,463 
(21.4) (40.8) 
Taken Credit Both from Formal and 
Informal Sources  
338 213 
(10.3) (5.9) 
Total 3,274 3,585 
Average Size of 
Outstanding 
Liability (in INR0.1 
million) 
Formal Only*** 9.4 3.4 
Informal Only*** 4.5 1.2 
Both*** 37.0 8.8 
- Average Share of Formal Sources 
(%) 59 62 
- Average Share of Informal 
Sources (%) 41 38 
Interest rate (% per 
month) 
 
Formal Only* 1.5 1.6 
Informal Only** 2.6 2.9 
Both 
  
- Formal* 1.8 1.3 
- Informal 1.9 2.2 
Note: ***, **, * - imply two sample t-test for mean equality is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level respectively.  
Source: Computed by authors based on NSSO (2012a) database 
 
Preliminary analysis therefore does not seem to support the hypothesis that informal sector 
enterprises face relatively higher costs of credit. This is in contradiction to the findings of the 
earlier studies (though conducted for Brazilian enterprises) that informal sector has limited 
access to formal credit and face relatively higher cost of credit (Araujo and Rodrigues Jr. 2016, 
de Paula and Scheinkman 2011). Results show that interest rates for un-registered enterprises are 
marginally higher than registered enterprises and the difference is much larger for informal 
sources of credit as compared to formal sources.      
 
5.2 Informality in Labour Market 
The existence of informality in labour market could also influence entrepreneurs’ decision to 
take registration. However, unlike informal credit market where entrepreneurs have limited 
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capacity to influence terms and conditions of the loans and method/ mode of repayment, 
entrepreneurs have freedom to set terms and conditions for employment and pay wages and 
salaries according to their preferred mode of payment, unless there is any specific rule to restrict 
them under labour laws or any other laws.16 In the presence of large scale unemployment and 
under-employment, it is likely that employees cannot influence the decision of the employer on 
the terms of conditions of employment and therefore employers’ (entrepreneurs) decision 
prevails. It becomes statutory obligation for any business entity to take registration under 
different Acts - like Factories Act, Provident Fund (PF) Act, Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) 
Act - if number of employees crosses the respective thresholds for registration.17 By not 
maintaining employment register and paying wages and salaries in cash, not only can 
entrepreneurs keep a substantial part of their activities out of books of accounts but also avoid 
any statutory obligations to provide benefits to employees (e.g., Provident Fund, Employee 
Insurance). Therefore, it is possible that regulatory aspects of the labour market might encourage 
informality in labour market which could then spill over to output market in terms of non-
registration for tax.       
Table 2 shows that percentage share of hired informal workers in total hired workers is similar 
across enterprises irrespective of their VAT registration status. There is no significant difference 
in employment pattern in hired workers between registered and unregistered enterprises. Almost 
one third of unregistered enterprises are run by working owners and by taking help of helpers 
and other workers. In both for registered and unregistered enterprises, informal workers hold 
significant share in total hired workers. This shows that existence of informality in labour market 
does not appear to be a feature specific to un-registered enterprises.        
Table 2: Sources of Labour and VAT registration 
Description Registered Un-registered 
Number of Observations      
  Hired Formal Workers Only 1,116 1,219 
 (11.0) (9.0) 
  Hired Informal Workers Only  8,707 12,275 
 (85.6) (90.3) 
  Hired Formal and Informal Workers 343 103 
 (3.4) (0.8) 
  Sub-Total – Hired Workers   10,166 13,597 
  Other Workers/ Helpers Only  901 2,548 
  Working Owners Only  662 3,530 
  Total Workers  11,729 19,675 
Average Number of Workers 
  
                                                          
16
 With effective from 28 December 2016, the Payment of Wages (Amendment) Act 2017 has been enacted to 
enable the Centre and state governments to specify industrial units which will have to pay wages only through 
cheques or by transferring money into bank accounts. 
17
 For our sample enterprises, correlation coefficient between registration under VAT and under any other Act is 
found negligible.   
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Description Registered Un-registered 
  Hired Formal Workers Only*** 5.9 2.9 
  Hired Informal Workers Only***  7.0 3.5 
  Hired Formal and Informal Workers*** 26.5 12.2 
    Formal Hired Workers***  7.1 4.4 
    Informal Hired Workers***  19.4 7.8 
  Hired Workers - Total***  7.6 3.5 
  Other Workers/ Helpers Only***  1.3 1.2 
  Working Owners Only***  1.12 1.08 
  Total Workers***  8.1 3.8 
Average of Hired Workers as Percentage of Total Workers (%)*** 65.9 60.9 
Average of Informal Hired Workers as Percentage of Total Hired 
Workers (%)*** 98.4 99.6 
Average Informal Workers as Percentage of Total Workers (%) 50.0 38.3 
Note: ***, **, * - imply two sample t-test for mean equality is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level respectively. 
Figure in the parenthesis shows the percentage share in total hired workers. 
Source: Computed by authors based on NSSO (2012a) database 
 
5.3 Capital, Investment and Productivity   
Market value of assets (excluding land and buildings) is a measure of size of an enterprise as 
well as capital base.18 Higher the value of assets implies higher the size. Table 3 shows that 
average market value of asset per worker (also known as capital – labour ratio) is significantly 
higher for registered enterprises as compared to unregistered enterprises. The finding supports 
the argument that informal sector is less capital intensive as compared to formal sector (de Paula 
and Scheinkman 2011). Registered enterprises have higher turnover per worker as compared to 
unregistered enterprises. It implies that, labour productivity in formal sector is higher than 
informal sector, and it supports the existing literature (de Paula and Scheinkman 2011, Araujo 
and Rodrigues 2016, IMF 2017).  Average annual turnover per INR of market value of total asset 
(also known as capital productivity) is higher for registered enterprises as compared to 
unregistered enterprises. This shows that average capital productivity of formal enterprises is 
higher than informal enterprises and it supports the existing literature. Registered enterprises 
have significantly higher market value of total asset as compared to unregistered enterprises. 
Predominantly enterprises use their own asset. However, some enterprises also hire asset on rent. 
Average market value of hired asset is higher for registered enterprises as compared to 
unregistered enterprises. Irrespective of registration status, monthly interest on hired asset is high 
and there is no significant difference in average monthly rent on hired asset between registered 
and unregistered enterprises. Average annual investment in registered enterprises is twice that in 
                                                          
18
 Assets constitute of plant and machinery, transport equipment, tools and other fixed assets, software and database, 
information, computer and telecommunications equipment, and capital work in progress. Land and building is not 
included in the asset base.  
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unregistered enterprises. The analysis shows that market value of asset is an alternative measure 
of the size of economic activities and registered enterprises have larger asset base as compared to 
unregistered enterprises, productivity of labour and capital is higher for formal enterprises as 
compared to informal enterprises, and also registered enterprises invest more on yearly basis as 
compared to their unregistered counterpart.            
Table 3: Asset, Labour and Capital 
  
Description Registered Un-registered 
Average Market Value of Total Asset per Worker (INR)(Capital 
– Labour Ratio)*** 50,545 29,830 
Average Annual Turnover per Worker (INR)(Output per 
Worker)*** 153,868 108,927 
Average Annual Turnover per INR of Market Value of Total 
Asset (INR)** (Output per unit of Capital)  
10,029 1,180 
Gross Value Added per INR of Annual Turnover  (INR)*** 0.19 0.23 
Gross Value Added per Worker (INR)***  31,293   26,527  
Gross Value Added per INR of Market Value of Total Asset 
(INR)* 
12.5 14.2 
Average Market Value of Total Asset (INR)** 146,902 114,563 
  Average Market Value of Own Asset (INR)** 143,998 113,358 
  Average Market Value of Hired Asset (INR) 177,281 111,647 
Average Per Month Rent on Hired Asset (%) 8.8 8.1 
Average Annual Investment (INR)*** 85,538 41,132 
Average Annual Turnover per INR of Annual Investment (INR)    11,807   8,098  
Note: ***, **, * - imply two sample t-test for mean equality is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level respectively. 
Source: Computed by authors based on NSSO (2012a) database 
 
Data shows that for registered enterprises capital-labour ratio is 1.7 times higher than 
unregistered enterprises. For registered enterprises output per worker is 1.4 times higher than 
unregistered enterprises. This implies that productivity of labour is higher for registered 
enterprises. Output per unit of capital is 8.5 times higher for registered enterprises as compared 
to unregistered enterprises. Therefore, both labour and capital productivities for registered 
enterprises are higher than unregistered enterprises.  
GVA per worker for registered enterprises is 1.2 times higher than unregistered enterprises. 
However, GVA per INR of capital asset is higher for unregistered enterprises as compared to 
registered enterprises. It shows that capital asset in unregistered enterprises add larger value than 
registered enterprises. GVA per INR of turnover is also higher for unregistered enterprises. In 
other words, unregistered enterprises have larger value addition per unit of output or turnover.   
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Average size of capital asset for registered enterprises is 1.3 times higher than unregistered 
enterprises. For registered enterprises hired asset is 1.6 times higher than unregistered 
enterprises. There is no difference in the average rent charged for hired asset across groups of 
enterprises. Therefore, presence of informality in asset market may not be a factor influencing 
entrepreneurs’ decision to take VAT registration.    
Average annual investment is 2.1 times higher for registered enterprises when compared to 
unregistered enterprises. Average annual turnover per INR of annual investment is 1.5 times 
higher for registered enterprises as compared to unregistered enterprises. This implies that 
registered enterprises make larger annual investment, their productivity is not consistently 
higher.    
 
5.4 MSME Regulation and Informality  
To test the VAT registration status of enterprises as per the categorisation under the MSMED 
Act, we restrict our sample to only manufacturing enterprises (in addition to other restrictions) 
and consider only market value of own asset (excluding land and buildings).Results presented in 
Table 4 show that as asset base increases, VAT registration increases. However, the phenomenon 
fails for ‘Medium Enterprises’, as their VAT registration status is not as good as other two 
categories.  
Table 4: MSME Regulation and VAT Registration 
Category of 
Enterprises 
No. of Sample 
Enterprises 
Percentage of Enterprises Registered under VAT 
Act 
Micro Enterprise  16113 19.05 
Small Enterprise  81 51.85 
Medium Enterprise  7 28.57 
All 16201 19.22 
Source: Computed by authors based on NSSO (2012a) database 
 
5.5 Self-policing of VAT and registration 
Self-enforcing (or self-policing) nature of VAT system is often cited as an inherent driver for 
encouraging formalisation of enterprises (Pomeranz, 2015). However, a careful look shows that 
VAT itself may not be adequate for all businesses to take part in the tax system. Businesses 
having low value addition (implies higher input costs) and strong forward linkages will find it 
incentive compatible to take VAT registration, as they will have low output tax liability, 
potentially high input tax credit and peer pressure from downstream business to take part in the 
tax system. Similarly, businesses having higher share of output being sold to final consumers, 
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might not face the same incentives as they are not part of a supply chain which requires flow of 
input tax credit.  
In another study using the same database, Mukherjee and Rao (2015) shows that if firms are 
classified into manufacturing and trading firms, the former have a higher ratio of gross value 
added to total turnover. This would mean that for a given output tax liability, manufacturing 
firms would have lower input tax credit claims when compared to trading firms. The self-
policing nature of VAT is relatively weak if ITC claims are small.  
The above analysis shows that there are several pull (e.g., productivity gain, lower interest on 
credit) as well as push (e.g., annual turnover, total workers, size of capital asset, annual 
investment) factors which may drive the decision of the entrepreneurs to take VAT registration. 
Enterprise specific factors (e.g., visibility - location of the business, place of business, type of 
ownership, year of operation, activities – manufacturing or trading, ratio of value addition in 
turnover) may influence decision of the entrepreneurs. Moreover, entrepreneur specific factors 
(e.g., age, level of education, socio-economic status) may influence their decision to take VAT 
registration. However, NSSO survey does not capture such information as respondent may not 
necessarily be the owner of the business. In addition, there are state specific factors (e.g., 
efficiency in tax administration, enforcement of tax rules and regulation, tax morale) which may 
influence the decision of entrepreneurs to take VAT registration. 
Using these different factors, in the following section, an attempt is made to use a multivariate 
approach to understand which of these factors appear to influence the decision of enterprises to 
register under VAT. 
 
6. Multivariate Analysis 
We use a bivariate heteroskedastic probit model for estimation of response probabilities for 
registration of enterprises under state Value Added Tax (VAT)/ sales tax act (regvatact).19 
‘hetprobit’ fits a maximum-likelihood probit model and it is a generalisation of the probit model. 
The estimated model and variables are described below. 
yi, i=1,…, n, is  a binary outcome variable taking on the value 1 (success) or 0 (failure). In the 
probit model, probability that yi takes on the value 1 is modeled as a nonlinear function of a liner 
combination of the k independent variable xi = (x1, x2, …, xk), 
Pr = 1|	
 = Φ	β
 
Where, β is constant k – dimensional vector and Φ() is a standard normal cumulative distribution 
function with variance one.  
                                                          
19
 We have used Stata (Version 13.1) command ‘hetprobit’for estimating the probit model. 
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Heteroskedastic probit generalises the probit model by assuming Φ() to be a normal cumulative 
distribution function with a variance (σ2) that is a function of independent variables. Following 
Harvey (1976), ‘hetprobit’ models the variance as a multiplicative function of m variables zi=(z1, 
z2, …, zm) with n observations each.  
 = exp	
 
Therefore, the probability of success as function of all independent variables is  
Pr = 1|	, 
 = Φ 	 !

 (1) 
For identification of the model (1), unlike in the index 	", no constant term can be present in . 
For convenience, let y be the n x 1 vector of all observations of yi, let X be the n x k matrix 
whose ith row is 	 and let Z be the n x m matrix with ith row of . Then the log likelihood 
function can be written as  
#$%", |, &, '
 = 	(#$Φ) 	
"
exp	
* + 1 − 
ln	1 − Φ
	"exp	



/
01
 
Given a set of n observed values of the random vectors y, x, z, in order to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimate, one maximises this function over the space of possible choices of ", 
 ∈
3456. 
Using this methodology, we run the following binary choice heteroskedastic probit model:  
7889:;<=<>= = 1|	, 
 = Φ ? 	 !
@   (2) 
Model 1 Specification:  
	" = "A + "1#=B8$C;98 + "#=C=<#DC8E98 + "F#9<8CCG + "H#C><=IC$CB= ∗
B8K<$ + "L:C;=<MMIM= + "NOP: + "NG8CG ∗ C<9 + "QM=<=9	RBOOI9M  
 = A#=B8$C;98 + 1#=C=<#DC8E98	      
Model 2 Specification:  
	" =
"A + "1#=C=<#DC8E98 + "#OE=;<#=C=<MM= + "F#=C=<#>89RI= + "H>89RI=PC8O<# +
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"L:;<=B8$C;98 + "S#9<8CCG + "N#C><=IC$CB= ∗ B8K<$ + "Q:C;=<MMIM= +
"TOP: + "1AG8CG ∗ C<9 + "11M=<=9	RBOOI9M  
 = A#=C=<#DC8E98	      
Dependent Variable:  
regvatact = 1 if the enterprise registered under VAT/Sales Tax Act, 0 if not.   
 
Scale Indicators (Push factors):  
lturnover – log of annual receipts/ turnover (in INR)  
ltotworker – log of total worker (full time and part time, male and female) 
lmktvaltotasst – log of market value of total (own and hired) asset (other than land and 
building) (in INR) 
ltotalcredit – log of total outstanding loan from all sources (in INR) 
 
Pull factors 
creditformal – 1 if there is outstanding loan from formal sources, 0 otherwise 
Enterprise Specific factors  
gvaturnover - ratio of Annual Gross Value Added and Turnover    
lyearoop – log of year of operation (as on 2011)  
locationout = 1 if location of the enterprise outside the household premises (permanent 
location), 0 otherwise  
govtassist = 1 if the enterprise received government assistance, 0 otherwise.20 
mfg – 1 if the enterprise is engaged in manufacturing only, 0 otherwise   
urban – 1 if the enterprise is located in urban area, 0 otherwise  
prop – 1 if Proprietary Enterprises, 0 otherwise   
oae – 1 if the enterprise is Own Account Enterprise, 0 otherwise21 
State Specific factors 
                                                          
20
 Assistances received  from the government include  financial  loan, subsidy, machinery/ equipment, training, 
marketing, raw  material, and others. 
21
 Enterprises are classified into two categories - Own Account Enterprise (OAE) and Establishment. OAE is an 
enterprise which is run by members of the household without hiring any worker on a fairly regular basis. 
Establishment is run by employing at least one hired worker on a fairly regular. 
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State Dummy – 1 for the Concerned State, 0 otherwise22 
Basic statistics for the data used is summarised in Table A3 in Appendix. The results of the 
estimation exercise are presented in Table 5.   
The results show that all the scale variables influence entrepreneurs' decision to take VAT 
registration positively and significantly. The results are as per our expectation, as an enterprise 
grows, it aspires to get integrated with larger chain of economic activities and therefore taking 
VAT registration enables them to pass on the input taxes to next level of economic agents. 
Access to credit from formal sources (creditformal) on the other hand, works as incentive (pull 
factor) factors which induces entrepreneurs to take VAT registration. In other words, while 
access to formal sector credit does not appear to be the sole determinant of the decision to remain 
informal or become formal, at the margin, it does seem to play a role in encouraging registration 
for VAT.  
Turning to enterprise specific factors, the results show that relatively old enterprises (operating 
for longer periods), enterprises located outside the household premises in urban areas, and those 
that received assistance from government are more likely to take VAT registration. On the other 
hand, enterprises having higher ratio of GVA in turnover (gvaturnover), engaged in 
manufacturing and own account proprietary enterprises are relatively less likely to take VAT 
registration. Enterprises having higher gvaturnover will face larger tax burden on output as 
compared to input tax credit available as credit, therefore they might be relatively reluctant to 
take registration under VAT. 
To capture state specific factors, we have used state dummies where we have taken Karnataka as 
a base state. The results show that, as compared to enterprises located in Karnataka, enterprises 
located in Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are more likely to take 
VAT registration. Similarly, enterprises located in Jammu & Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Assam, 
West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu are less likely 
to take VAT registration. With reference to enterprises located in Karnataka, enterprises located 
in Punjab, Rajasthan, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat are equally likely to take VAT 
registration.  
                                                          
22We have considered only Non Special Category States and States having observations above 100.  
19 
 
Table 5: Regression Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Name Coeff. S.E. M.E. Coeff.   S.E. M.E. 
lturnover 1.670 *** 0.244 0.192         
ltotalworker 0.992 *** 0.156 0.118 0.493 *** 0.043 0.171 
lmktvaltotasst       0.018 * 0.010 0.006 
ltotalcredit         0.317 *** 0.022 0.109 
creditformal         0.155 *** 0.05 0.053 
gvaturnover         -1.195 *** 0.137 -0.41 
lyearoop 0.104 *** 0.035 0.011 0.092 *** 0.023 0.031 
locationout*urban 0.506 *** 0.093 0.055 0.227 *** 0.043 0.078 
govtassist 0.758 *** 0.195 0.085 -0.062   0.062 -0.021 
mfg -1.271 *** 0.190 -0.134 -0.510 *** 0.057 -0.173 
prop*oae -0.360 *** 0.098 -0.039 -0.157 ** 0.062 -0.054 
Jammu & Kashmir -0.930 *** 0.214 -0.096 -0.688 *** 0.119 -0.223 
Himachal Pradesh 1.614 *** 0.313 0.183 0.461 *** 0.133 0.156 
Punjab 0.313 0.193 0.035 -0.009   0.127 -0.003 
Uttarakhand -1.083 *** 0.264 -0.110 -0.602 *** 0.175 -0.196 
Haryana 1.180 *** 0.266 0.133 0.573 *** 0.135 0.192 
Delhi 1.322 *** 0.281 0.149 0.507 *** 0.175 0.17 
Rajasthan 0.012 0.181 0.001 -0.142   0.132 -0.049 
Uttar Pradesh 1.370 *** 0.253 0.154 0.624 *** 0.123 0.208 
Bihar 1.011 *** 0.263 0.114 0.542 ** 0.217 0.181 
Assam -1.816 *** 0.320 -0.175 -0.318 * 0.191 -0.107 
West Bengal -2.217 *** 0.338 -0.216 -0.726 *** 0.096 -0.237 
Odisha 0.558 * 0.290 0.062 0.126   0.166 0.043 
Chhattisgarh -1.370 *** 0.321 -0.136 -0.082   0.243 -0.028 
Madhya Pradesh -0.201 0.167 -0.022 0.052   0.169 0.018 
Gujarat 0.114 0.162 0.012 -0.124   0.105 -0.042 
Maharashtra -1.269 *** 0.241 -0.129 -0.467 *** 0.099 -0.156 
Andhra Pradesh -0.921 *** 0.202 -0.096 -0.229 ** 0.091 -0.078 
Kerala -1.253 *** 0.251 -0.127 -0.379 *** 0.093 -0.128 
Tamil Nadu -1.605 *** 0.282 -0.159 -0.467 *** 0.094 -0.156 
Constant  -25.859 *** 3.774   -4.477 *** 0.287   
lturnover 0.080 *** 0.010           
ltotalworker 0.081 *** 0.017   0.102 *** 0.026   
Number of observations      31,321                 6,733        
Odd Ratio 0.595     0.914       
LR chi2 4404.52 *** df: 26   1858.5 *** df: 29   
Log likelihood -16322.2     -3559.0       
Pseudo R2 0.368       0.484       
chi2 for Ho:lnsigma2=0 172.33 *** df: 2   15.69 *** df: 1   
Notes: ***, **, & * imply estimated z-statistic is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively.  
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S.E. – Standard Error, M.E. - Marginal effect  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 
Two interesting results come out from this study – first, on average, unregistered enterprises face 
higher cost of capital from informal sources of credits. This could be understood as follows: 
higher cost of capital could imply economic viability of the enterprise is lower and hence the 
entrepreneur would have less interest in being registered for tax purposes. Further, higher cost of 
capital is perhaps associated with borrowing from informal sources. Interest payments on such 
borrowing might have to be paid in cash requiring the need to keep transactions out of the books 
of accounts.23 If this direction of causation in decision making is valid, it would suggest that 
increasing access to formal sources of credit can provide a windfall benefit to governments in the 
form of higher tax registration and perhaps a resultant increase in tax collections. 
Second, increase in assistance from government is associated with higher probability of 
registration with VAT departments. This result too supports greater intervention by the 
government in supporting unincorporated units, even from a tax department perspective. 
A counter-intuitive result however is that the coefficient of the dummy for manufacturing is 
negative in regression models – it suggests that all other things remaining the same, the 
probability of a manufacturing unit being registered for VAT/sales tax is lower than that of a 
trading firm. This result is apparently counterintuitive since as compared to enterprises engaged 
in trading, manufacturing units face lower VAT registration threshold. This result suggests two 
things – one, it is possible that manufacturers are small units not part of supply chain with their 
own marketing systems. Since they are not integrated with the rest of the economy, they may not 
perceive any merit in registering for VAT. Second, the fact that manufacturing units are less 
likely to register suggests that the tax departments are unable to monitor the economic activity 
being undertaken in their jurisdiction. 
Depending on respective turnover based threshold set for VAT registration by State 
Governments, different State tax administration face different level of challenges of bringing 
unincorporated enterprises under the tax system. To integrate the unincorporated enterprises with 
the rest of the economy, it is imperative to bring the enterprises under the tax system. For 
enterprises, while it is often argued that there are costs associated with remaining outside the tax 
system, since a number of firms are choosing to remain outside the tax system, it appears that the 
                                                          
23
 It is also possible that firms which choose not to be part of the formal economy prefer to access informal sources 
of credit. In such cases, the decision not to register with the tax department would precede the sourcing of credit. 
One such case could be where the activity of the enterprise is very volatile – such an activity may not benefit from 
formalisation. A quick analysis to check this hypothesis however did not reveal any results – number of months of 
operation was used as an indicator of volatility of the business. There is no difference between registered and 
unregistered firms in the average number of months of operation. 
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self-policing (or self-enforcing) dimension of the VAT regime does not provide adequate 
benefits (Keen and Smith 2006). Even the presently existing tax compounding schemes do not 
seem to be attractive enough to bring the small dealers into the system. It is therefore important 
to explore alternative measures which could change this scenario on the ground. From the results 
in the present study, it appears that facilitating access to formal sector credit might be one such 
instrument. The other can be a focus on expanding the consumer’s incentives to ask for an 
invoice. If larger segments of the economy ask for invoices for the purchases made, the incentive 
and the option to remain out of the tax regime would be correspondingly reduced.  
Location of the enterprises also plays an important role to get registered with State sales 
tax authority. Enterprises which are located outside the households (in fixed premises) and urban 
areas are easy to identify and could potentially attract inspection from State tax administration 
and therefore they should be more likely to take registration. Our data analysis shows that even 
in this category not all enterprises are registered. It throws up question on efficiency of State tax 
administration. An efficient tax administration could potentially look for opportunities to expand 
the tax base by bringing more assessees under the tax net.  
It is not expected that mere registration with state tax authority would result in sudden 
substantial tax revenue mobilisation for states, but gradual increase in registration with tax 
authority would result in integration of unincorporated enterprises with integrated supply chains 
of formal economy. In the long run, it is hoped that enterprises will reap the benefits of economic 
integration through backward and forward linkages and for tax administration, they will get a 
cleaner system to deal with. Apart from interventions like improved access to formal sector 
credit and incentives from governments, tax departments also conduct regular surveys to identify 
errant taxpayers. This activity however is low on the list of priorities of the tax departments, 
working with limited manpower. In the GST regime, it is not clear which agency would take on 
this vital responsibility.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: VAT Threshold in Selected States in India 
State  
VAT Registration Threshold 
(INR0.1 million) Average Per capita GSDP (INR): 
2009-10 to 2011-12 
Per Capita Income 
Category** Manufacturer Trader  
Andhra 
Pradesh 7.5 7.5 42,215 LMIS 
Assam 6 6 24,114 LIS 
Bihar* 5 5 13,258 LIS 
Chhattisgarh* 2 10 31,130 LMIS 
Delhi 10 10 108,159 HIS 
Gujarat 2 5 62,075 HIS 
Haryana 5 5 65,015 HIS 
Himachal 
Pradesh 4 6 57,334 UMIS 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 0 0 33,069 LMIS 
Karnataka* 7.5 7.5 45,227 UMIS 
Kerala* 10 10 56,819 UMIS 
Madhya 
Pradesh* 5 5 25,035 LIS 
Maharashtra 10 10 64,963 HIS 
Orissa 10 10 29,670 LIS 
Punjab 1 5 50,896 UMIS 
Rajasthan 5 10 31,140 LMIS 
Tamil Nadu 10 10 59,107 HIS 
Uttar Pradesh 5 5 19,756 LIS 
Uttarakhand* 5 5 56,323 UMIS 
West Bengal 5 5 34,543 LMIS 
Minimum 
  
13,258 
 
Quartile 1 
  
30,765 
 Quartile 2 
(median)   43,721  
Quartile 3 
  
57,778 
 
Maximum 
  
108,159 
 
Note: *-Threshold Limit is taken from the data shared by the VATInfoline.com (personal communication). For 
others it is based on personal communication to the respective State Commercial taxes Department.   
**- Low Income State (LIS): PCGSDP <Quartile 1, Lower Middle Income State (LMIS): Quartile 1> PCGSDP< 
Quartile 2, upper Middle Income State (UMIS): Quartile 2< PCGSDP< Quartile 3, High Income State (HIS): 
PCGSDP > Quartile 3.  
Source: Personal Communication  
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Table A2: Selected State-wise VAT Registration Status of Sample Enterprises 
 
State 
No. of Enterprises having Annual Turnover above VAT 
Registration Threshold 
No. of Enterprises having Annual Turnover below VAT 
Registration Threshold 
Registered  Unregistered No Response Total Registered  Unregistered No Response Total 
Jammu & Kashmir 233 (6.3) 1548 (41.8) 1918 (51.9) 3699 0 (0.0) 3 (100) 0 (0.0) 3 
Himachal Pradesh 411 (48.4) 321 (37.8) 117 (13.8) 849 91 (4.4) 803 (39.2) 1154 (56.3) 2048 
Punjab 474 (16.0) 846 (28.6) 1638 (55.4) 2958 51 (1.6) 572 (18.4) 2490 (80.0) 3113 
Uttarakhand 186 (19.5) 574 (60.2) 193 (20.3) 953 29 (1.1) 1054 (40.9) 1493 (58.0) 2576 
Haryana 543 (28.4) 331 (17.3) 1038 (54.3) 1912 55 (1.4) 276 (7.0) 3610 (91.6) 3941 
Delhi 573 (35.3) 266 (16.4) 786 (48.4) 1625 114 (3.3) 381 (10.9) 3012 (85.9) 3507 
Rajasthan 616 (29.8) 604 (29.2) 846 (40.9) 2066 153 (2.2) 831 (12.0) 5968 (85.8) 6952 
Uttar Pradesh 1385 (33.6) 973 (23.6) 1760 (42.7) 4118 276 (1.6) 1386 (8.0) 15720 (90.4) 17382 
Bihar 310 (13.6) 307 (13.5) 1656 (72.9) 2273 49 (0.7) 204 (3.1) 6394 (96.2) 6647 
Assam 231 (13.9) 880 (52.9) 551 (33.2) 1662 61 (1.4) 1285 (29.3) 3034 (69.3) 4380 
West Bengal 928 (15.9) 3850 (66.0) 1056 (18.1) 5834 101 (0.8) 4218 (33.9) 8127 (65.3) 12446 
Odisha 219 (29.3) 142 (19.0) 386 (51.7) 747 80 (1.2) 440 (6.6) 6194 (92.3) 6714 
Chhattisgarh 131 (20.7) 352 (55.7) 149 (23.6) 632 36 (1.2) 746 (24.7) 2236 (74.1) 3018 
Madhya Pradesh 634 (25.5) 1079 (43.5) 770 (31.0) 2483 88 (0.8) 1855 (17.8) 8495 (81.4) 10438 
Gujarat 861 (25.8) 1288 (38.6) 1191 (35.7) 3340 68 (1.1) 1015 (16.8) 4957 (82.1) 6040 
Maharashtra 888 (34.7) 1451 (56.8) 217 (8.5) 2556 267 (2.3) 4476 (38.1) 7007 (59.6) 11750 
Andhra Pradesh 943 (29.1) 1523 (47.1) 769 (23.8) 3235 204 (1.4) 3287 (22.1) 11393 (76.5) 14884 
Karnataka 669 (39.2) 770 (45.2) 266 (15.6) 1705 165 (2.4) 2135 (31.4) 4498 (66.2) 6798 
Kerala 615 (33.2) 1043 (56.2) 197 (10.6) 1855 196 (2.3) 4020 (48.0) 4152 (49.6) 8368 
Tamil Nadu 879 (29.0) 1527 (50.5) 620 (20.5) 3026 237 (1.6) 4904 (33.7) 9397 (64.6) 14538 
Total 11729 (24.7) 19675 (41.4) 16124 (33.9) 47528 2321 (1.6) 33891 (23.3) 109331 (75.1) 145543 
Source: Computed by authors from NSSO (2012a) database 
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Table A3: Basic Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Whether the enterprise is registered under VAT/ Sales Tax Act? 
(regvatact, yes=1, 0 = No) 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Years of operation as on 2011 since the year of initial operation  
(yearoop) (Years) 12.30 10.62 0 152 
Whether the enterprises located outside the household premises? 
(locationout, 1=yes, 0=no) 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Whether the enterprise is located in an urban area? (urban, 1=yes, 
0=rural) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
locationout*urban 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Whether the enterprise has received any government assistance? 
(govtassist, 1=yes, 0=no) 0.02 0.16 0 1 
Whether the enterprise is engaged in manufacturing? (mfg, 1=yes, 
0=no)  0.35 0.48 0 1 
Whether the enterprise is a proprietary? (prop, 1=yes, 0=no) 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Whether the enterprise was an Own Account Enterprise (OAE) during 
the last 365 days? (oae, 1=yes, 0=no) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
prop*oae 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Total Number of Workers (all types, including working owner) 
(totalworker) (Nos.) 4.83 12.41 1 602 
Ratio of Annual Gross Value Added and Annual Turnover 
(gvaturnover) 0.24 0.21 0.001 3.24 
Whether the enterprise has outstanding loan from formal sources of 
credit? (crditformal, 1=yes, 0=no) 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Annual turnover (turnover, in INR million)a 3.92 42.40 0.002 6,480.0 
Market value of total asset (mktvaltotasst, in INR million) 0.12 1.05 0.00 101.0 
Total Outstanding Loan (both from formal and informal sources) 
(totalcredit, in INR million) 0.57 2.64 0.00 127.0 
Note: For Jammu & Kashmir, registration threshold is zero.  
Source: Computed by authors from NSSO (2012a) database. 
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